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Abstract 
Normative, scientific and economic pledges to Electronic Health Record (EHR) data-driven 
research (for health and wealth) attempt to reconfigure public health data as an asset for 
realising multiple values across healthcare, research and finance. In this paper, we examine 
some of the expectations, frictions and uncertainties involved with the assetisation of de-
identified NHS patient data by (primary care) research services in UK. We introduce the 
concept of ‘asymmetric assetisation divergence’ to study the various practices of configuring 
and using this data, both as a continuously generated resource to be extracted and as an asset 
to be circulated in the knowledge economy. As data assetisation and exploitations grow bigger 
and more diverse, the capitalisation of these datasets may constitute EHR data-driven research 
in healthcare as an attractive technoscientific activity, but one limited to those actors with 
specific sociotechnical resources in place to fully exploit them at the required scale. 
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Introduction  
I believe, however, that as we seek to unlock a new age of enterprise, we might need to 
go further in exploring ways of unlocking new growth without increasing public 
spending. As with a business in a cash crisis, we need to shore up the profit and loss 
account by reducing waste, as the Government have so quickly done. Equally, as with 
real business growth, we need to look creatively at our balance sheet and think about 
our assets and our competitive advantage. Everyone in government, in every 
Department at every level, should be asking themselves, "What can we sell to the rest 
of the world, in order to repair our damaged public finances?"…The third is the 
National Health Service. I know from my own experience that we are sitting on billions 
of pounds-worth of patient data. Let us think about how we can unlock the value of 
those data around the world. (Freeman, 2010) 
It was November 2010, in the aftermath of the last global financial crisis, and the UK House 
of Commons was debating the country’s growth policy. George William Freeman MP (Con), 
who four years later was appointed Minister for Life Sciences at the Department of Health and 
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, unwrapped his own vision for the 
country’s economic growth. Problematising the state as a ‘business in a cash crisis’ that needs 
to enter ‘a new age of enterprise’, the MP asked public services to start looking for public assets 
they could sell to potential investors so as to restore public finances.  
While such national policy expectations and narratives of wealth creation out of NHS 
patient data are not new, they have intensified after the 2008/9 financial crisis as (corporate) 
biomedical innovation is being outsourced to the academic sector (Robinson, 2018) and 
(personal) data has emerged in the economic literature as the world economy’s new asset class 
(cf. BIGT, 2003; Department of Health, 2011; HM Government, 2018; WEF, 2011). At the 
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same time, national health systems are ‘morally obliged’ to become data-driven so as to stop 
‘flying blind’ and, start ‘saving lives’ and taxpayers’ money (du Preez, 2015). They are now 
expected to become not only more (cost-)effective in personalised healthcare but also expand 
their wealth-creating role as investors in biomedical Research and Development (Department 
of Health, 2011; Kelsey and Cavendish, 2014). 
The UK has been consistently advertised as the home to one of the best and biggest 
healthcare datasets in the world (HM Government, 2018). Its universal, (largely) computerised 
and centrally managed public healthcare system (NHS) has created volumes of linked datasets 
from longitudinal Electronic Health Records (EHRs) across all levels of care. In fact, the 
demand for, and availability of, NHS patient data, for research into anything from 
pharmacovigilance, drug prescribing and safety, standards of care and trial recruitment, 
continues to grow year after year (NHS Digital, 2018). Commercial models are currently being 
debated in the pursuit of lawful and publicly acceptable contractual arrangements between the 
NHS and private sectors for creating and realising the values of this public asset (HM Treasury, 
2018; Harwich and Lasko-Skinner, 2018). Recently, the economic value of curated NHS 
patient data was estimated at £9bn per year for both the NHS and the patients (Wayman and 
Hunerlach, 2019). However, these valuations neglect the investments in technoscientific and 
market infrastructures required to reap such financial and epistemic benefits. 
Our aim with this paper is to explore how narratives of innovation and normative 
pledges to the interrelatedness of health and wealth attempt to mobilise and configure public 
health data as an asset for realising multiple values across healthcare, research and finance 
(Welsh and Wynne, 2013; Hogarth, 2017). For this, we take as our case study the work of 
research services in England that synthesise and release NHS patient data to actors in 
healthcare and beyond, such as the Clinical Practice Research Datalink (CPRD), QResearch, 
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The Health Improvement Network (THIN), CALIBER and ResearchOne. Understanding 
‘valuation as a social practice’ (Helgesson and Lee, 2017: 533), we focus on the intertwined 
societal, economic, and sociomaterial expectations and logics such research services translate 
and enact. This enables them to realise and extract the values of this public asset for their 
organisational sustainability and for other actors across the economy (cf. Star, 1985; Brown 
and Michael, 2003; Birch, 2017). Responding to Birch’s (2019) call for more empirical STS 
investigations of how ‘things are turned into assets’ (Muniesa et al., 2017) and controlled for 
the extraction of rents (such as licences or fees), we show that the assetisation of NHS patient 
data by research services is a complex and laborious process. It involves the configuration of 
competing and complementary frictions, as well as uncertainties around (inter alia) coding 
practices, regulation, acceptability, supplies of  datasets, technoscientific capital and user 
demand.  
We demonstrate that NHS patient data assetisation by these research services serves 
four main purposes: maintaining organisational sustainability, developing their capability to 
continue assetising data, developing the epistemic and human capital of this field (e.g. 
development of new scientific methods and training of new data scientists) and, 
consequently, strengthening their role in the valorisation, performativity and financialisation 
of EHR data-driven research. For this, we have coined the concept of asymmetric assetisation 
divergence to explore their expectations and valuations as well as their normative, scientific 
and economic discourses, and practices. (Birch, 2017a; Muniesa et al., 2017). In this way, we 
elucidate the asymmetries around the sociotechnical and financial infrastructures that are 
configured for this assetisation, including the control of data flows for research, the public’s 
participation in decision-making and the various knowledge assets (e.g. phenotypes, 
biomarkers, quality improvement reports, recruitment pools of research participants, clinical 
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risk prediction algorithms, and scientific publications) that are made (im)possible for 
healthcare, academic and biomedical networks of actors. 
This paper draws on ethnographic material mainly from 27 interviews conducted in 
2016 with 7 GPs who were involved in clinical commissioning, information governance, 
medical ethics teaching or academic EHR data-driven research, 9 citizens who reported 
having opted out from and/or had campaigned against programmes of NHS patient data 
capitalisation (i.e. care.data) and 11 health data researchers. The last group of participants 
comprised statisticians, epidemiologists, data architects and research facilitators who have 
worked with data from and/or for one of the more established research services in England 
that have been collecting and curating de-identified NHS patient data from a network of 
contributing GP practices across the country to support EHR data-driven research (Vezyridis 
and Timmons, 2016). These included QResearch – a partnership between the IT supplier 
EMIS Health and (since 2019) the University of Oxford (previously the University of 
Nottingham) – that holds data from 1500 (out of approximately 9800) GP practices in the 
UK; the CPRD – the oldest research service with a history dating back to 1987 – that extracts 
and curates data from GP practices using IMS Health’s computer system and (since 2018) 
also from EMIS Health; THIN by Cegedim SA that extracts data from over 550 GP practices 
that use the Vision primary care software (approximately 6% of the UK population); 
CALIBER at the University College London that has a licence with CPRD since 2012 and 
ResearchOne by TPP and the University of Leeds that (since 2013) houses data from both 
primary and secondary care providers using the company’s SystemOne software. All 
interviews focused mainly on the opportunities and the (technical, social and ethical) 
challenges of realising the benefits of NHS patient data-driven research, particularly in 
English primary care. Health data researchers and GPs were also asked more specific 
questions around the challenges of developing and maintaining such research services, 
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including issues of sociotechnical infrastructure and information governance, as well as of 
conducting observational studies with NHS patient data. These interviews were supplemented 
with documents, reports and online material from these research services’ website. Our 
analysis is also informed by the first author’s non-participant observation of team meetings at 
some of these research services, national health data analytics workshops and public 
consultations on the ethics of NHS patient data exploitations as well as by completing 
university training courses for data researchers related to the opportunities and challenges of 
conducting observational studies with EHR primary care data in the UK. 
In the next section, we theorise data assetisation drawing from the sociology of 
expectations and science and techology studies (STS) (Borup et al., 2006; Birch, 2017a, 
2019). This forms our analytical approach for studying the performative promises,  
normativities and sociotechnical practices involved in these situated processes of NHS patient 
data capitalisation (Muniesa et al., 2017). Following this, we examine some of the 
expectations and uncertainties as well as frictions and risks involved in the process of 
transforming NHS patient datasets into research assets. We focus not only on the scientific 
but also on the economic, political, social and ethical valuations these research services have 
to navigate through. We conclude speculating on the future of EHR data-driven research and 
argue that asymmetric assetisation divergence may indeed foster innovation in EHR data-
driven research and development (cf. Kleinman and Vallas, 2001). However, it is also 
creating unequal configurations of access to knowledge production and public scrutiny as 
these research services compete for data and funding. More centrally controlled flows of data 
and assets for the extraction of rents may, in the end, benefit only those networked actors that 
have the sociomaterial resources (including financial capital) and knowledge expertise to 
capitalise on these (public) datasets for narrowly specified purposes (cf. Birch, 2019; 
Muniesa et al., 2017). 
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Theorising research expectations, service valuations and data assetisations 
From a STS perspective, expectations have been theorised as both products and 
producers of innovation, mobilising, and institutionalising people and resources (Brown and 
Michael, 2003; Brown, 2003; Borup et al., 2006; Tutton, 2011). Scholars in this field have 
shown how expectations produce, in their own material-discursive way, the necessary 
‘dynamism and momentum’ (Brown and Michael, 2003) as well as the ‘incentives and 
obligations’ (Brown, 2003) for human and non-human actors to come together and ‘wishfully 
enact’ (Tutton, 2011) particular versions of the future.  
Research that examined the role of biomedical initiatives in the creation of new forms 
of scientific, social, political and economic expectations has demonstrated, for example, how 
human tissue, medical data and genomics are assetised for scientific collaborations and 
circulations in knowledge economies (cf. Cooper and Waldby, 2014; Dagiral and Peerbaye, 
2016; Tarkkala et al., 2018). Geiger and Gross (2019) have shown how consumer genomics 
firms mobilise a ‘platform business model’ in order to assetise genomics information via 
specific processes of ‘accumulation’, ‘augmentation’ and ‘obscuration’ of related uncertainties. 
These platforms simultaneously maintain constant flows of data and values between sellers and 
customers across different markets. Barrett et al. (2016) demonstrated how specific 
sociomaterial configurations enacted by digital platforms create multiple epistemic, ethical,  
and financial expectations from online health communities. Likewise, Timmons and Vezyridis 
(2017) and Vezyridis and Timmons (2017) demonstrated how scientific, ethical, social and 
economic valuations (re)configure a range of new socio-material processes and relationships 
between patients, hospitals, universities and biomedical industries in the process of assetising 
medical waste and patient data.  
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A main purpose of this paper, therefore, is to understand how these research services 
enact NHS patient data assetisations in order to frame, sustain and expand the ‘liminal space’ 
between hopes and promises and, concrete products and assets (cf. Hogarth, 2017; Brown, 
2003). For this, we conceptualise assetisation as: ‘a process in which value is constituted by 
the management of value and valuation, especially as they relate to organisational entities and 
their capacities’ (Birch, 2017a: 470). Consequently, we treat any scientific, ethical and 
economic values around NHS patient data not as something ‘stable and predefined, but rather 
as something grappled with, articulated, and made in concrete practices’ (Dussauge et al. 2015: 
2). Values, as Birch (2017a: 462, 466) asserts, are ‘immanent or latent in material things (e.g., 
commodity) and/or discursive claims (e.g., hope)’ and they require ‘active, ongoing, and 
performative management’. Both conceptually and empirically, as Brown (2003: 5) argues, 
expectations and values eventually become both ‘inseparable’ and ‘tradable’, forming ‘the 
basis of exchange relationships within “communities of promise”’.  
Expectations of EHR data-driven research for speculative valuations of health and 
wealth have, therefore, their own important role in how GPs, NHS patients and the data they 
co-produce are imagined and valued to perform for EHR data-driven research within a high 
stakes  biomedical knowledge economy (Dussauge et al., 2015; Birch, 2017a; Wienroth et al., 
2019). They are fundamental for the mobilisation of various state, commercial, and academic 
actors as well as  capital for the assetisation of NHS patient data and the performativity of 
specific types of health data access markets (cf. Brown, 2003; Birch, 2017a; Vezyridis and 
Timmons, 2017).  
During our fieldwork, we noted, for example, how health data scientists valued the 
availability of EHR data to answer different types of research questions in healthcare. Their 
anticipatory discourses highlighted the unique opportunities now available to researchers from 
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the mining of data – anything from clinical to demographic and geographical  – to identify 
causes of diseases, complication and management rates and, prescribing practices. They were 
often excited about the potential for life sciences in the UK to lead the development of new, 
EHR data-driven, practices for the prevention, and treatment of diseases or for conducting more 
‘pragmatic’ randomised controlled trials to assess the effectiveness of drugs (Powell et al., 
2017).  
Research services, such as those examined here, appear to have assumed this 
technoscientific and economic role of materialising and capitalising on the multiple scientific,  
normative and economic promises and values of EHR data-driven biomedicine out of this 
public good (i.e. NHS patient data) (cf. Brown and Michael, 2003; Martin, 2015; Birch, 2019). 
They do so by enacting the (negotiated and contested) infrastructural work, i.e. the situated 
narratives, heterogeneous relationships and sociomaterial practices, necessary to bring this 
imagined future forward (cf. Brown, 2003; Dagiral and Peerbaye, 2016). 
Thus, for the present study we understand the capitalisation of these public datasets as 
a sociotechnical performance that translates imaginaries and transforms resources into assets 
in order to realise the expectations of specific actors for value and capital, i.e. future earnings 
whether that is ‘money, or something comparable’ (Muniesa et al., 2017: 12; Birch, 2017a; 
Birch, 2019; Dussauge et al., 2015). Following Muniesa et al. (2017), we treat assetisation as 
a process that extends organisational boundaries to include social, technological, and economic 
infrastructuring of institutions, practices and individuals across society for the production of 
those resources deemed appropriate for capitalisation. Research services studied here mediate 
and service ‘across boundaries between different scales, levels, times and communities’ (Borup 
et al., 2006: 293; Dagiral and Peerbaye, 2016), i.e. between patients, GP practices, IT suppliers 
and researchers, for new, contemporary and future, ‘secondary data uses’.  
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As we show below, GPs (or other healthcare professionals) and the data they co-
produce during consultations and treatments are disentangled from the local sociomaterial 
networks and transformed, via EHRs, from objects of clinical labour to objects and means of 
scientific inquiry and economics (cf. Denis and Goëta, 2017). It is through specific relational 
sociomaterial infrastructures that they are turned into intangible knowledge assets for a range 
of scientific and other purposes (cf. Dagiral and Peerbaye, 2016; Birch, 2017a; Muniesa et al., 
2017; Birch, 2019). Their uninterrupted participation into the valuation practices of these 
research services facilitate their ceaseless assetisation (Wienroth et al., 2019) for the continuous 
capitalisation of NHS patient data and the financialisation of EHR data-driven research (cf. 
Muniesa et al., 2017; Birch, 2017a).  
However, there is not a uniform approach to such performances. As Lilley and 
Papadopoulos (2014: 979) also remind us: ‘valuation is the outcome of a complex set of intra-
actions inside the worlds in which the clashes of valuation unfold’. We see these research 
services as navigating through various political, economic and epistemological promises and 
valuations of NHS patient data-driven research. We echo Kleinman and Vallas’ (2001) 
observations that ultimately such technoscientific-intensive services ‘asymmetrically 
converge’ their  market,  academic and public healthcare expectations and logics in the process 
of transforming NHS patient data into ‘promissory assets’ for monetary circulations in 
knowledge economies (cf. Martin, 2015; Cooper and Waldby, 2014).  
We assert that research services, such as the ones studied here, have already been 
hybridised as they pursue their organisational sustainability (and/or profitability) for the 
capitalisation of NHS patient data (cf. Kleinman and Vallas, 2001), albeit to various creative 
configurations of norms and practices. As they practice different modi operandi to financialise 
their operations (Birch, 2017a), which increasingly resemble those of other digital platforms 
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(cf. Geiger and Gross, 2019), different (non-)economic outcomes are made (im-)possible (cf. 
Waldby and Mitchell, 2006; Dussauge et al., 2015; Helgesson and Lee, 2017).  
Central to our study, therefore, is how, during the process of assetisation, such research 
services embed specific value assumptions, structure practices, and (re-)configure relations of 
co-production (with GPs and patients). They (re-)order data flows, legitimise data uses and 
validate data users (Martin, 2015; Dagiral E and Peerbaye, 2016) for multiple purposes: 
creating their asset-based incomes via the licensing of curated datasets (cf. Birch, 2017); 
supporting the (further) development of healthcare knowledge products and services (e.g. 
scientific publications and quality improvement reports) (Dagiral and Peerbaye, 2016); 
pursuing their own research and other innovation projects (e.g. analytic scripts and phenotypes 
for GP practices and the research community). To explore and describe the ‘diverging registers 
of value’ (Dussauge et al., 2015) and the (in)commensurate valuations these research services 
are making and articulating, the asymmetries in knowledge practices (Tsoukas, 1997) and 
configurations of sociotechnical networks involved in the assetisation of NHS patient data, we 
introduce the situated concept of asymmetric assetisation divergence.  
 We use the above concept to consider, firstly, asymmetries between the operational 
(including financial) and, the scientific and public health logics and valuations that affect the 
assetisation (cf. Kleinman and Vallas, 2001; Dussauge et al., 2015). Secondly, we use it to 
consider whether the co-producers and providers of this public data, i.e. patients and healthcare 
professionals (GPs) have enough information and power to participate in the shaping and 
direction of this assetisation (Brown, 2003). Thirdly, to consider whether data assetisation can 
diverge (asymmetrically) because some of the processes involved can take place at different 
scales between these research services based on resources that are available to them, e.g. 
funding, access to  data, human and technical resources, as well as networks of data providers 
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and customers. Following that, we reflect on the kind of new or existing asymmetries and 
inequalities of access to resources, information and knowledge research services may (re-
)produce as they assetise NHS patient data (Brown, 2003). 
Expectations of networked materialities and alternative epistemologies for divergent 
assetisations 
This section explores which and how social and economic expectations, motivations and 
uncertainties are valued by stakeholders for the capitalisation of NHS patient data (cf. Tutton, 
2011; Tarkkala et al., 2018). We focus on how the current state of affairs (Callon, 1984) in 
healthcare provision and research is problematised and we describe some of the political, 
economic and technoscientific arrangements in place for these research services to extract, 
prepare and circulate more and more data (Vezyridis and Timmons, 2017; Geiger and Gross, 
2019). Lastly, we discuss how such research services, in their attempt to respond to the 
competition for data, resources, customers and epistemic impact, may differentiate their 
operations and diverge in their assetisation of NHS patient data (Barman, 2002). 
Among researchers and some GPs, understandings of EHR data-driven research 
focused on expectations that by collecting and analysing data from all aspects of healthcare at 
a large scale potentially huge opportunities for the improvement of human health could be 
derived. The data tracking of individual events (e.g. treatments) related to patients, as they 
navigate the healthcare system, was portrayed as a new and unique approach to reconstruct 
medical histories and follow patient journeys ‘from cradle to the grave’. They asserted their 
determination to study ‘pretty much every disease that there is out there’ and make sense of 
the complexity of human health and illness based on the unprecedented availability of 
(decontextualised) information stored in EHRs (Tsoukas, 1997). By mobilising  economies of 
scale and converging diversified datasets – from the many isolated and small data repositories 
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across (primary and secondary)  care into fewer centralised ones – they anticipated the 
reduction of the time, cost, and the uncertainties involved with research and the provision of 
healthcare. By narrowing temporal, spatial and epistemological asymmetries in the collection 
and analysis of data, the speed of knowledge production was expected to increase as multiple 
reuses of these datasets from greater pools of participants and for a variety of purposes were 
being made possible: 
…everything in a unified database, everything in one place, so it’s accessible, it is 
structured, is very convenient…because you don’t know what might be important later 
on down the line and to collect everything from time zero is a more efficient way of 
collecting data than collecting your data, then finding out that you need like seven new 
different measurements, and to go back and collect that would be very difficult, very 
costly so collecting everything with the hope that one day it might be useful to someone 
is a very bad idea (laughs) but it’s efficient. (Researcher 2) 
While for more ‘traditional’ epidemiological studies of rare or long-term conditions and 
treatments, researchers have to collect data from hundreds or thousands of individual 
participants,  with routinely collected EHR data the number of research participants can be in 
the range of millions. It is the size, breadth and representativeness of the populations covered 
that constituted, in the eyes of these stakeholders, these datasets as unique resources for 
conducting observational studies in a much faster, cheaper and more ‘pragmatic’ way than ever 
before (Powell et al., 2017; Harwich and Lasko-Skinner, 2018). NHS patient data was, thus, 
valuated and valorised by ascertaining the effectiveness of EHR data-driven research in the 
modelling of healthcare by other means: a very promising alternative approach to research and 
innovation of similar effectiveness.  
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While the assertion that ‘size is an advantage’, that science and society cannot just 
ignore, constituted a strong motivation for the EHR data-driven research communities, this is 
not to say that the significant issues of data quality and the susceptibility of these datasets to 
many biases were not acknowledged by data researchers (we will return to these issues in the 
next section). The growing concerns around the epistemological misconception that bigger is 
necessarily better, and critiques of the reproducibility of EHR data-driven research were 
accepted (Lipworth et al., 2017). However, the risks and uncertainties that this asymmetrical 
quality of EHRs introduce in EHR data-driven research (e.g. research bias) were considered as 
epistemological challenges (rather than actual barriers to EHR data use) that do not have to be 
addressed in full before pursuing the establishment of a research service for the assetisation of 
NHS patient data. There is not a uniform approach to be followed. For instance, some of these 
research services had proceeded more cautiously in this area and have been trying to recruit 
GP practices with ‘good’ coding practices, in order to then carefully curate the extracted data. 
Others worried less about data quality and more on finding a way to gather everything in one 
place first and deal with issues of data quality later. In any case, researchers in the field 
overwhelmingly anticipated the overcoming of such challenges soon enough and as 
datafication of healthcare and coding standardisation across the NHS continue to grow (cf. 
Brown, 2003).  
…we've got this wealth of data that we can get hold of; we don't know quite how to use 
it. We must use it because there must be stuff in there that is going to be really valuable 
basically, and from [the IT supplier's] side, they knew that and they want it to be used. 
(Researcher 9) 
The above motivation that there must be a way forward with this data because now we can, 
which Fourcade and Healy (2016: 16) so aptly asserted as ‘the ceremonial aspect of the data 
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imperative’, was based not only on arguments of size, availability and effectiveness but also 
on an anticipatory uncertainty, for example, around (already) problematic numbers 
participating in research. Welsh and Wynne (2013: 543) have argued that ‘scientific 
authorities…declare the public meaning of technoscientific innovations and controversies to 
be matters of risk or science’. Here, we noted declarations around data assetisation, and by 
extension around the support of the work of such research services, as a matter of concern in 
overcoming (existential) risks within the life sciences, e.g. low trial recruitment rates (see 
Powell et al., 2017). The ‘reworking [of] epistemological asymmetries’ (Brown, 2003: 18), 
was, therefore, framed as a necessity for both society and the rest of the technoscientific 
communities ‘because 10 years from now we won’t have any other cohorts remaining’ and the 
future of population studies will be compromised. Consequently, for data researchers the 
development of new methodologies for EHR data-driven research are materialising their 
expectations of ‘getting all that we can out of this data’ and, continue to advance biomedical 
knowledge and improve healthcare against an uncertain epistemological future.  
At the same time, there are also other stakeholders that come with their own 
expectations, valuations and role for the assetisation of this public asset. For example, there is 
the role of and expectations by state actors to drive and facilitate, via investment and regulatory 
frameworks, the assetisation and capitalisation of NHS patient data for the benefit of the 
national economy (cf. Timmons and Vezyridis, 2017). As one data researcher noted:   
Government Ministers have been quite open about it, wanting to make the UK and the 
UK data sources world leaders in this kind of research, which usually means they want 
it to be a money spinner in some way or other. (Researcher 5)           
For suppliers of primary care computer systems maintaining or contributing to a research 
service can materialise unique, albeit diversified, expectations. While our participants talked 
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about certain research services that just want to capitalise EHR data and ‘licence just about 
everything it’s possible to licence’ to expand their presence in the biomedical research data 
market, they also identified several opportunities for the other stakeholders. For example, they 
discussed how the establishment of ‘knowledge transfer partnerships’ with academic 
institutions that can analyse these datasets has allowed them to advance their portfolio of 
services they provide to GP practices that purchase their system. GP practices have now been 
given a unique opportunity to contribute to epidemiological research and also to the 
development of new digital clinical decision support tools to improve healthcare. In exchange, 
they offer to such research services some new (and asymmetrical) advantages for the 
assetisation of NHS patient data, particularly when compared to smaller research services and 
institutions that rely on bespoke data extractions for research. Through their piecemeal 
arrangements with their contributing GP practices and other healthcare organisations, whole 
networks of local data providers and infrastructures for data extractions can now be maintained, 
making the continuous updating of research databases with new data a relatively seamless and 
near-real time process. These databases can then be managed by either the IT supplier 
exclusively, the IT supplier in conjunction with the academic or governmental partner, or 
exclusively by the academic partner. 
For instance, CPRD and THIN provide quality improvement reports to collaborating 
GP practices. CALIBER has developed and curates a common pool of more than 50 
computable phenotypes for researchers to identify and analyse the EHR of patients with a 
particular condition. QResearch has developed a number of risk calculators (e.g. for fractures, 
cancer, stroke, diabetes) (Hippisley-Cox et al., 2017). These and other research assets can then 
be provided to the research and GP communities (and some of them to the public) either free 
of charge and/or as licensed knowledge products via private limited companies (see 
https://clinrisk.co.uk). In the process of realising the values of EHR data-driven research,  
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research studies and publications that have used research services’ data are also getting 
assetised and valorised under specific targets of ‘knowledge transfer’, increasing their 
reputational (and financial) value in this technoscientific market (cf. Barman, 2002) (Vezyridis 
and Timmons, 2016). For instance, QResearch has supported (as of March 2019) more than 
165 peer-reviewed scientific publications, THIN more than 600 and, CPRD more than 2200 
with targets of number of supported studies set annually (see MHRA, 2016). 
Thus, there is not a single but multiple problematisations (Callon, 1984) for the 
assetisation of NHS patient data and the multiple, divergent, assets that can be made possible 
to fulfil common as well as diverse expectations and valuations of this public asset. On the 
other hand, expectations, no matter how ambitious or effective they might first appear in 
mobilising stakeholders and various forms of capital (e.g. human, technical, financial), they do 
not necessarily secure stable sociomaterial entanglements across science and/or the economy. 
While they become indispensable parts of data valuations and assetisations within particular 
communities, the gap between hype and reality has to be maintained by such research services 
in order to keep capitalisations going (cf. Brown, 2003). 
Sociomaterial frictions and organisational uncertainties in asymmetrical asset 
productions 
In this section, we look into how research services and researchers attempt to internalise and 
render manageable the various uncertainties and asymmetries involved in the production, 
assetisation and use of this data (cf. Star, 1985; Dagiral and Peerbaye, 2016; Denis and Goëta, 
2017; Powell et al., 2017). Specifically, we explore how processes of assetisation reveal and 
mitigate diverse epistemological, economic, social and material ‘frictions’ (Edwards, 2010) in 
data production and analysis. They also shape how medical phenomena are expected to be 
coded so as to increase the quality and value of this asset for research (Petersen et al., 2019).  
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During our interviews, we were repeatedly exposed to data researchers’ frustration with 
and, in some cases, limited understanding of, the way GPs code medical phenomena in EHRs. 
They often expressed their surprise, for example, at the fact that the codes GPs use to record 
even the same single disease could vary substantially from one GP practice to another. They 
also emphasised the impact such inadequate coding practices have on the overall quality and 
integrity of the datasets with which they work as well as the time and effort they have to put to 
mitigate it in preparation for analysis. As one researcher highlighted: 
..a woman with prostate cancer, okay, fine, I have to remove this observation, it's kind 
of most obvious, but … when you're thinking whether this person has osteoporosis or 
not, whether they have prescriptions, maybe these prescriptions are not right, maybe 
they’re for cancer, not for osteoporosis … When it's definitely bad data, you remove 
the observation. For example, if it's 50 people altogether when you use a sample of 
50,000, that's okay, so it doesn't affect the conclusion. (Researcher 11) 
This problem with data inconsistencies and redundancies was attributed by researchers and 
GPs mainly to the fact that the data is not collected primarily for research purposes. As they 
explained, data is collected to do the GP’s clinical and ‘business’ work (cf. Petersen et al., 
2019). Coding is, first, a practice highly contingent on the resources and effort (e.g. staff, time, 
information technology and skills) each GP practice can allocate for this purpose (Verheij et 
al., 2018). This is why research services often aim at recruiting mostly ‘big’ GP practices with 
‘good’ management that can contribute patient data of good quality. At the same time, GP 
coding practices are also sensitive to the particularities and (unintentional) influence of the 
particular GP computer system in use (Verheij et al., 2018). As one experienced researcher 
described to us:  
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I’m sure you’ve seen those patterns of prescribing trends and how they differ nationally 
when actually it’s just picked up that different clinical systems order their drugs 
differently, so obviously clinicians pick the drugs at the top of the screen and it’s just 
picked up a difference in the clinical systems, rather than GPs’ underlying behaviour, 
which was the same. (Researcher 10) 
Moreover, GP computer systems allow the recording of structured (‘coded’) and unstructured 
patient (health and administrative) data (‘free text’) to diverse levels of granularity but without 
the use of a universally-adopted health coding scheme, like those used in hospitals (i.e. ICD-
10). In effect, between regions within the UK different classification systems and versions of 
the same system (e.g. Read codes – version 2 and 3) have been adopted by the IT suppliers 
and, thus, GPs. To overcome this geographical clustering of systems and datasets 
(Kontopantelis et al., 2018), ‘simply a side effect of where IT suppliers have been able to sell 
their software’, a research service has to go to great lengths to map these coding schemes used 
by (primary and secondary) healthcare providers across the country into more ‘formalised and 
universal structures’ (cf. Denis and Goëta, 2017).  
Thus, contrary to common misconceptions about the ready-made value of big health 
data, these extracted datasets are not just clinical artefacts ready for research after some 
technical translations of variables. And the availability of more EHR data does not necessarily 
make the NHS more ‘transparent’ to outsiders for all sorts of research purposes. Our interviews 
underline the situatedness of coding practices and how entangled they are with other diverse 
local sociotechnical practices, normativities and valuations beyond the clinical aspects of 
healthcare provision (cf. Denis and Goëta, 2017). In order to address and mitigate the 
uncertainty such ‘knowledge asymmetries’ (Tsoukas, 1997), between the observer (i.e. data 
researcher) and the observed (i.e. healthcare professional), introduce to the generalisability of 
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any research outcome, research services also work on the introduction and mapping of more 
advanced classification systems (i.e. SNOMED CT). More standardisation of coding (of even 
more data) is expected to allow, in the future, the assetisation of more symmetrical and, 
therefore, more researchable data (Dagiral and Peerbaye, 2016).  
Until then and in contrast to GPs and their familiarity with individual patient cases and 
coding practices, data researchers continue to be uncertain (and often less transparent in their 
scientific publications) as to whether any patterns in disease prevalence and trends they observe 
in the data should be attributed to the actual disease, demographic shifts, the patient 
management software, changes of clinical coding guidelines, preferences for information 
disclosure and coding during patient consultations or the particular pay-for-performance 
scheme, such as the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), used to incentivise specific 
coding practices (Verheij et al., 2018). QOF has, in fact, been instrumental in improving data 
coding and collection across GP practices contracted by the NHS. Introduced in 2004, this 
point-based reward and incentive national programme for GPs, which currently constitutes up 
to 10% of their income, aims at standardising and improving the care they provide by having 
them meet specific quality targets in certain clinical areas (e.g. coronary heart disease, heart 
failure, stroke, diabetes mellitus, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, cancer, dementia, 
depression and obesity). However, as Forbes et al. (2016) observed, QOF has not actually 
achieved its primary purpose as it conflated high performance with high quality of the provided 
care: 
A few years ago they brought in QOF around depression, so that if you coded somebody 
as having depression, you then had to set on a pathway and had to do certain things by 
certain times, and if you didn't, you lost money. So there was a huge drop in anybody 
being diagnosed, coded as depression, even though that's what they may have been 
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treated for. So you can have knock-on effects. People also might ask not to be coded, 
because of the stigma, you don't want something in your medical record that says 
something that you think might have an adverse effect on, I don't know, insurance. So 
I think things aren't ever black and white, are they? (Researcher 9) 
It is because of such intricacies of the entangled sociomaterial and economic practices of data 
coding for divergent purposes of use and often conflicting local assetisations and 
capitalisations (e.g. QOF remuneration) that researchers and GPs interviewed emphasised the 
considerable scientific and technical expertise required to assetise and use NHS patient data 
for research. Consequently, the assetisation of this data is not only about investments and 
maintenance of technologies of data storage, curatorial practices and analytical methods. It is 
also about investments in interdisciplinary teams of ‘knowledge workers’ (Kleinman and 
Vallas, 2001) who are not only experts in computer and data science but also in healthcare in 
order to make sense of the knowledge and practice that shape the coding of medical phenomena 
and, thus, the local production and use of datasets.  
Among data researchers, however, there was also a wide acknowledgment of ‘the huge 
shortage of skills across the board’ to fully realise the values of these datasets. While 
(university) training was thought to be improving, issues around its quality and cost as well as 
‘letting the younger generations know that [health data science] is a career path that’s available 
to them’ remain a challenge. They were worried that considerable pitfalls may occur in this 
field in the future if training and recruitment are not addressed satisfactorily, particularly as 
more and more data providers are joining these – or developing their own – research services 
and more researchers ‘with less and less skill’ from other data-driven (e.g. financial) industries 
are getting access to these datasets. Other experienced researchers underlined the asymmetries 
of capability some (smaller) research services have been facing as they compete for expertise 
asymmetric assetisation divergence 
 22 
and resources within this field. As EHR data-driven research is expanding and datasets 
collected ‘grow dramatically’ in size and variety (e.g. genomics), the acquisition and 
maintenance, for example, of ‘high performance computer systems’ to analyse these datasets 
becomes a significant challenge.  
The skills required to design and model the systems are the same skills that are required 
to model systems in finance. And the salaries of science, they’re much lower, so it’s 
really difficult to find the right people to do the job. Plus the resources, a lot of the 
software, hardware…they’re under licence, for instance…and when you want to use 
some good software packages, in order to be able to do your work, in the academic and 
public sector, they’re not readily available, and that puts a barrier up of the things that 
you can do. (Researcher 2) 
The process of assetising NHS patient data, therefore, reveals and involves several noteworthy 
asymmetries of information and practice. There are asymmetries regarding the maintenance of 
local sociomaterial infrastructures and processes, including GP practices, NHS patients and IT 
suppliers, capable enough to facilitate the production of datasets of acceptable levels of quality 
for research. The mitigation of such asymmetries (and uncertainties) often involves finding 
ways to overcome other processes of assetisation and capitalisation of data and coding (e.g. 
QOF, computer systems and their market distribution, consultation and coding preferences). 
Lastly, it requires the maintenance of appropriate research infrastructures (resources and skills) 
of enough capability to clean, prepare and guarantee quality datasets for use.  
Politics, economics and societal valuations for asymmetrical asset flows 
As we started identifying research services’ own normative understandings of how and by 
whom these datasets should be capitalised, we became interested in exploring the way they are 
gradually maintaining an essential, mediating, role (Callon, 1984) in the assetisation and 
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circulation of data. Here, our focus is on the particular political economic, social and 
professional environment within which they operate but also (re)enact to normatively increase 
the responsibility of other stakeholders (e.g. GPs, patients, regulators) for the disentanglement 
of NHS patient data from its local sites of production. We also explore some of the scientific, 
organisational, social and ethical asymmetries of this assetisation, produced as research 
services are re-entangled with data producers and other infrastructures required for the 
continuous extraction of data and the management of expectations, flows and values (Brown, 
2003; Birch, 2017a). 
As we showed previously, there has been considerable interest from all stakeholders to 
share and analyse NHS patient data for diverse purposes. However, notions of the (perceived) 
usefulness of EHR data-driven research were not shared uniformly across stakeholders, 
particularly when compared to more established types of scientific inquiry. For instance, data 
researchers were frustrated by the fact that few people outside their (academic) communities 
fully ‘understood’, and prioritised in their work the production and sharing of good quality 
data. This was often due to the fact that, as some GPs explained, the data GP practices provide 
to research services was not expected to come back to them in some ‘useful’ (to their practice) 
form, e.g. clinical guidelines for treating patients. While GPs generally acknowledged some of 
the capabilities of EHR data-driven research for improved healthcare, such as for healthcare 
planning and identification of public health trends, some of them were also more cautious about 
placing this type of research among the so called ‘cutting edge medicine’:  
Certainly the capabilities of [EHR data-driven research] and the scope to look at 
information is great. I mean I think if you're looking at genuine treatments for diseases, 
the bottom line comes down to the hard graft with looking at molecules and cancer and 
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such. It comes down to laboratory technicians testing on cells and in petri dishes and 
microscopes…to try and work out and find drugs that are effective. (GP 3) 
Moreover, the competitive environment of expectations and anticipations in which the 
capitalisation of NHS patient data takes place does not appear to be maintained only between 
the various groups of stakeholders that may benefit from it. The process of assetising intangible 
and reusable resources, within an increasingly marketised environment, reveals specific kinds 
of competition within particular groups of stakeholders. For instance, even within the data 
research communities there can be a combination of factors, that makes the sharing of this data 
difficult task across their networks. Issues that were often attributed to the marketisation of 
higher education and public healthcare, such as personal agendas and career aspirations, fears 
of litigation, intellectual property rights and competition for research funds, were thought to 
impede the establishment of a culture of openness in data sharing for the wider benefit of 
science.  
One particular problematic situation that stood out during interviews was around the 
extent to which a research service could support an increasing number of applications for data 
access. The capabilities of research services to support other (especially non-affiliated) data 
researchers with data and expertise are not identical amongst them. Whether it is fees or 
research outputs some form of (mutually beneficial) collaboration and/or exchange has to take 
place to compensate for the work involved in preparing datasets for analyses. 
It’s true that people that have access to the databases do tend to set themselves up as 
gatekeepers and be a bit choosy about who they work with. Sometimes that’s in 
furtherance of their own careers, other times it’s because the data are complicated and 
they can’t support every person to do a project, so inevitably you support the ones that 
you’re interested in. (Researcher 5) 
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Contrary to some common societal expectations that any research team (with a project 
approved by the research services’ own Independent Scientific Advisory Committee for its 
scientific benefits and information governance compliance) could access data, some of these 
research services have their own additional restrictions on eligibility. Various asymmetries of 
collaboration between research services and the wider academic and biomedical research 
communities shape divergent forms of NHS patient data assetisation. For example, CPRD can 
provide data to any research team from across the world as long as some of its members have 
experience working in UK primary care. QResearch, on the other hand, provides access to data 
mainly to teams from UK universities, with at least one member registered with the General 
Medical Council, while pharmaceutical companies are excluded unless the research project is 
about drug safety.  
At the same time, the capitalisation of NHS patient data under an industrialised 
environment means that data researchers and research services are expected to internalise and 
enact the associated financial logics of EHR data-driven research in the UK. Research services 
operate usually (but not exclusively) on a not-for-profit basis. While they do not usually charge 
directly for the datasets, they do charge for the support they provide to researchers to access 
data (e.g. infrastructure, application and project set-up, training, data preparation and release). 
They may charge (fixed or variable) fees for individual projects or for their annual (commercial 
and non-commercial) licences of data access and support. For instance, CPRD’s new pricing 
model charges £75,000 (excluding VAT) for its non-commercial (i.e. academic, government, 
charity) multi-study annual licence and more than four times that for the commercial one. 
CALIBER charges a fixed fee of £25,000 per approved project.  
Since public information on how these cost-recovery charges are calculated by research 
services is limited, we can only assume that this valorisation of access is a flexibly interpretive 
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activity for research services to sustain (financially) their operations and mitigate any 
asymmetries of resources and capital they experience for competitive and quality data 
assetisation.  These include; direct financial support from research charities and commercial or 
governmental partners, research grant success rates, whether personnel and infrastructure is 
hosted by another organisation (e.g. University), physical location of the research service (e.g. 
corporate, governmental or academic buildings in London or the Midlands) and whether any 
other special financial arrangements with GP practices are in place (e.g. for the number of 
active patients they include in the database and/or for additional data beyond the EHR). In 
cases where researchers want to link GP records with hospital records and mortality data, these 
research services have (for an additional fee) to go through, the statutory trusted third party 
responsible for the handling and linking of NHS patient records (NHS Digital).  
As demand for up-to-date datasets is constant, data assetisation requires not only new 
circulations of data to more users but also continuous data production facilitated by an 
appropriate regulatory framework for data researchers and research services to lawfully handle 
sensitive (NHS) patient data. This framework in England evolves around a rather outdated 
legislature piece of executive power that allows the Secretary of State for Health to overide the 
common law duty of confidentiality and the need for patient consent for specified medical 
purposes (e.g. medical research) (see Section 251 of the NHS Act 2006 and Health Service 
Regulations 2002). While it has facilitated an unprecedented expansion of the so called 
‘secondary use’ of NHS patient data, during the interviews, it was still problematised as an 
unavoidable but also necessary burden within organisational and scientific routines: a 
bureaucratic activity separate from the wider societal and historical context of unconsented 
medical research and part of the costs involved with the assetisation of these datasets.  
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Some researchers understood information governance in this area to be a ‘hygienic’ 
practice in ethics (Vezyridis and Timmons, 2019) of critical importance for minimising moral 
frictions and, thus, maintaining ‘social sustainability’ (cf. Brown and Michael, 2003; Tupasela, 
2017) with the public and the healthcare professionals that co-produce the data. Others, 
acknowledging their limited understanding of the complicated legal framework surrounding 
the use of these datasets, suggested the introduction of new disciplines within research teams 
(e.g. information governance experts) for advising researchers on the legal and ethical 
legitimacy of research designs. Others directed their frustration towards regulators who could 
do more to ‘tighten up on things’ for faster (and cheaper) access to curated datasets and, 
therefore, to knowledge production, especially in an industry still operating under a fragmented 
framework of multiple (public and private) providers acting as ‘owners’ of these datasets: 
..whenever we go to for a question to one of these [data providers], they say that they 
have to do the linkage for us … so if you go to NHS they say they have to do the 
linkage, if you go to the GP data, they say they have to do it, and other sources like 
clinical registries for cancer they are not easy to access and even if you [have] a very 
good high quality protocol then the problem is how should we link the data, because 
they will not hand it to you. (Researcher 4) 
Intertwined financial and regulatory asymmetries of access become more evident as data 
researchers often struggle to conduct their work within a competitive technoscientific 
environment that requires them to be at the forefront of fast and always relevant scientific 
knowledge production (Brown and Michael, 2003). While they ‘understand’ that research 
services ‘sell their product’, the ‘whacking costs’ for buying bespoke extractions and linked 
datasets, particularly by those not affiliated with these research services, have created 
considerable and asymmetrical (financial) barriers to research (Gilbert et al. 2015). In the 
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dynamic field of healthcare, where practices and objects of study are constantly in flux (e.g. 
prescriptions of medications), data is not only ‘expensive to work with because of all the 
processes that are involved to generate it, keep it clean and keep it secure’ but it becomes ‘old’ 
quickly. Speed of knowledge production becomes of paramount importance for EHR data-
driven research:  
It all costs money and if you have money, then it's easier…I've been doing lots of studies 
without funding, because it's all for hot topics, and then by the time you get funding, 
it's gone, the public is not interested. But then if you have funding you can buy linkages 
to other sources, like a cancer registry or other registers.  (Researcher 11) 
Lastly, and notwithstanding some criticism on issues of medical confidentiality (Brown et al., 
2010), these research services have not attracted the public outcry that other exploitations of 
these public datasets did in the past, namely NHS England’s defunct care.data (see Vezyridis 
and Timmons, 2017; Freeman, 2016), and Alphabet’s DeepMind unlawful contractual data 
arrangements with certain London NHS Trusts (see Powles and Hodson, 2017). Citizens 
interviewed were generally supportive of research that benefits the common good but were 
increasingly sceptical of NHS patient data exploitations that often take place away from the 
public eye (cf. Skovgaard et al., 2019; Vezyridis and Timmons, 2019). They also highlighted 
the NHS’s characteristic information ‘paternalism’ around NHS patient data capitalisations and 
expressed their frustration with the fact that information about such research services are 
‘basically non-existent’. All this asymmetry of information, while it was still a great challenge 
for them, as NHS patients, to get access to their EHR and try to understand what is in there that 
such research services continuously assetise. For those few interviewees that were more aware 
of these research services, it was because of their own personal research and privacy concerns, 
especially after the aforementioned debacles. This is not to say that such research services do 
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not advocate openness and transparency about their operations. However, there is limited 
information to be found, for example, on their websites about which GP practices contribute to 
them with NHS patient data and/or which research projects they have approved (or rejected) 
for data access. As such, it is only through scientific publications that an interested citizen 
could conclude how NHS patient data is used by these research services, while having to rely 
solely on their GP practice to let them ‘know whether [they are] on these databases’ and how 
they could opt-out from a research service, if they so wish. 
Thus, research services’ simultaneous assetisation of highly complex data and 
management of data assets flows becomes a relatively competitive and contradictory exercise 
in organisational stability (cf. Tupasela, 2017; Denis and Goëta, 2017; Geiger and Gross, 
2019), introducing new or incorporating existing asymmetries in the capitalisation of NHS 
patient data and healthcare research: prioritisation of EHR data-driven research (over other 
disciplines), competition for funding and scientific career development, cumbersome 
information governance frameworks, gated access to data and linkages, competition for human 
and technological capital (within and beyond the sector), variable distribution of benefits, 
limited public awareness and engagement.   
Conclusion 
In this paper, we examined some of the expectations, frictions and uncertainties involved with 
the assetisation and capitalisation of NHS patient data (Birch, 2017a) by UK research services. 
Drawing on the sociology of expectations and (economic) STS literature, we brought into focus 
the performativity of these research services for EHR data-driven research to demonstrate the 
way they reconfigure practices, responsibilities and accountabilities for materialising specific 
promises of innovative healthcare reserch (cf. Brown, 2003; Petty and Heimer, 2011). For this, 
we treated these research services as heterogeneous assemblages (Callon, 1984) enacted in 
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order to assetise NHS patient data. We showed that this assetisation is both the outcome and 
the driver of various competing epistemic, and economic expectations and valuations (Brown, 
2003; Birch, 2019). Divergent assets for healthcare and biomedical research are then produced 
via complex and situated practices that are enacted within a specific competitive and regulated 
environment increasingly entangled into (financial) industry expectations, logics and practices 
(Martin, 2015; Robinson, 2018). In this way, research services maintain a balance between 
establishing and expanding the health data science field, securing their organisational 
(including financial) sustainability, supporting biomedical and healthcare innovation and, 
contributing to the (knowledge) bio-economy, while also maintaining their public 
acceptability. 
NHS patient data was found to be configured and used both as a continuously generated 
resource to be extracted from the NHS as well as an invaluable asset to be circulated in an 
asset-based biomedical knowledge economy for the enactment of multiple and divergent 
ontologies in healthcare and beyond (cf. Dagiral and Peerbaye, 2016; Denis and Goëta, 2017). 
These include observational studies, patient recruitment for research, pragmatic trials, clinical 
risk predictions, income and so on. As producers, users and brokers of such assets, at the 
intersection of the public healthcare, academic and biomedical sectors (Timmons and 
Vezyridis, 2017), these organisational entities are gradually becoming valued and valorised 
‘obligatory passage points’ (Callon, 1984) in a social, political and economic shift of the 
‘performative management of value’ (Birch, 2017a) of these public healthcare datasets and 
EHR data-driven research.  
These research services are constantly attempting to realise and capitalise on their 
multiple epistemic, ethical, reputational, research service, platform and financial values out of 
(asymmetric and divergent) data assetisations (cf. Barrett et al., 2016). They not only converge 
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and translate expectations and promises but also construct new notions of productivity, 
adequacy, quality and transparency in EHR data-driven research (cf. Birch, 2019). They 
reconfigure EHR data-driven research as a (cost-)effective and more pragmatic alternative type 
of population health studies for a more promising and less risky future of improved healthcare 
(Brown, 2003; Borup et al., 2006). They also participate in; the reconfiguration of healthcare 
as a datafied technoscientific and ‘transparent’ practice (Tsoukas, 1997); the NHS as both the 
means and the subject of data labour; and the patient-citizen as a scientific, corporate, and 
moral resource for continuous data co-production (with the NHS) (cf. Brown, 2003). The 
numbers of contributing GP practices, sizes of populations covered, data fields, time periods 
included and speeds of updating their databases with new NHS patient data are valuated and 
valorised. Information governance, including de-identification of EHRs, consent and public 
engagement are mobilised as a political economic apparatus (Birch, 2017b) of institutionalised 
altruism and volunteerism for minimising external moral frictions around the direction of NHS 
patient data assetisation. 
In effect, they have assumed the overall role of ‘de-risking’ the costly assetisation of 
these datasets for actors in the academic and biomedical industries (cf. Brown, 2003; Cooper 
and Waldby, 2014; Robinson, 2018). They internalise the uncertainties and risks involved – 
and externalised by the NHS (cf. Robinson, 2018) – in valuating, creating, qualifying and 
mobilising the data assets as well as the capital of disjointed professional communities for 
shaping renewed promises of health and wealth (Tarkkala et al., 2018). They are pragmatic in 
the frictions and challenges they face around datasets’ completeness and integrity, access 
delays and costs (Powell et al., 2017), clustered geographical coverage of populations, varied 
cultures of collaboration and data sharing or inadequate public engagement. At the same time, 
however, they participate in the externalisation of other risks and uncertainties related to data 
assetisation back to the NHS and society at large. These include: costly datasets and 
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infrastructural incapacity, inadequate standardisation of coding practices and extractions, 
burdensome information governance for data extraction and linkage, limited public or 
professional acceptability, restricted funding and investments and, inadequate supplies of data 
scientists to produce data assets (cf. Denis and Goëta, 2017; Kleinman and Vallas, 2001). In 
this way, they ‘extensify’ valuations and, thus, they attempt to commit stakeholders in ever 
more data assetisations (cf. Lilley and Papadopoulos, 2014; Borup et al., 2006; Robinson, 
2018). 
Lastly, we found that this assetisation of NHS patient data is asymmetric in several 
noteworthy ways. First, although research services attempt to maintain their organisational 
(financial) sustainability and/or market dominance, the rents for these assets are seen as 
prohibitive for researchers conducting these observational studies (Gilbert et al. 2015). They 
now have to compete for funding in order to acquire increasingly diverse, and complex 
datasets, produced out of various asymmetries of coding and other knowledge practices (cf. 
Tsoukas, 1997; Barman, 2002). Asymmetries were also found with regards to the limited 
information and role GP practices and the public receive in order to participate in the shaping 
of the normative direction of NHS patient data capitalisation for the benefit of public 
healthcare. Finally, as these research services compete for data and customers, while 
embarking on their own scientific endeavours, they asymmetrically diverge in their assetisation 
of NHS patient data. Each service operates under different agreements with IT suppliers and 
other data providers across the country. In an attempt to differentiate their service for an 
intertwined epistemic and market dominance (Barman, 2002), they not only provide access to 
carefully curated datasets but also to various other (digital) assets of objectified information 
and knowledge about healthcare (cf. Tsoukas, 1997; Birch, 2019), such as: disease-specific 
code lists, phenotypes, biomarkers, quality improvement reports, recruitment pools of research 
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participants, clinical risk prediction algorithms, analytic scripts, data dictionaries, scientific 
publications and so on.  
We conclude by arguing that the capitalisation of (NHS) datasets by such hybridised 
organisational entities (Kleinman and Vallas, 2001) may replace restrictions of access to data 
from the many individual organisational silos (e.g. GP practices) that hold disparate datasets 
to fewer and bigger silos where data is converged into licensed databases out of closed-source, 
proprietary clinical systems. Data assetisation continues to grow bigger and more diverse in 
size, complexity and scope (e.g. genomics, wearables and medical imaging) under a political-
economic environment of industrialised scientific competition and production of expectations, 
assets and capital (Brown, 2003). Financial and other epistemic restrictions of access to NHS 
patient data-driven research may, in the end, stabilise an oligopolistic ‘data acess market’, 
attractive and affordable only to those actors that have the capital and the sociomaterial 
infrastructure in place to ‘buy’ access to data and undertake this kind of research at the required 
scale and depth (Powles and Hodson, 2017).  
We suggest that checks and balances regarding research services’ ontological, 
epistemological and ethical role as biomedical knowledge makers and brokers for the benefit 
of society at large should be considered. Accountable requirements for the fulfilment of their 
‘long-term promises’, rather than of their short-term return-on-investment opportunities, 
should be elaborated for transparent, inclusive and equitable research agendas and knowledge-
making practices. This is especially urgent at a time when the role of EHR data-driven research 
is gradually moving beyond the concept of ‘secondary use’ and onto the longitudinal 
management of population health and the contemporary planning of (national) health systems.   
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